This study explores the e¤ects of patent protection in an R&D-based growth model with …nancial frictions. We …nd that whether stronger patent protection stimulates or sti ‡es innovation depends on credit constraints faced by R&D entrepreneurs. When credit constraints are non-binding (binding), strengthening patent protection stimulates (sti ‡es) R&D. The overall e¤ect of patent protection on innovation follows an inverted-U pattern. By relaxing the credit constraints, …nancial development stimulates innovation. Furthermore, patent protection is more likely to have a positive e¤ect on innovation under a higher level of …nancial development. We consider cross-country panel regressions and …nd supportive evidence for this result.
INTRODUCTION
In this study, we explore the e¤ects of patent protection in an R&D-based growth model.
Our growth-theoretic analysis of patent policy features …nancial frictions in the form of potentially binding credit constraints on R&D entrepreneurs. As in Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005), due to moral hazard, R&D entrepreneurs may not be able to borrow as much as they want for their R&D investment. When these credit constraints are nonbinding, we …nd that strengthening patent protection by increasing patent breadth leads to a larger amount of monopolistic pro…t, which stimulates R&D and technological progress.
This positive monopolistic-pro…t e¤ect captures the traditional view of patent protection.
However, when the credit constraints are binding, we …nd that the monopolistic distortion arising from patent protection leads to more severe …nancial frictions, which sti ‡e R&D and slow down technological progress. We refer to this e¤ect as a negative …nancial distortionary e¤ect of patent protection.
The intuition of this …nancial distortionary e¤ect can be explained as follows. As in the seminal study by Nordhaus (1969) , patent protection causes monopolistic distortion, which in turn reduces aggregate income in general equilibrium and tightens credit constraints faced by R&D entrepreneurs in the presence of …nancial frictions. Our mechanics relies on credit constraints to make R&D a constant fraction of aggregate income. Then, the monopolistic distortion of patent protection on aggregate income reduces R&D and economic growth when credit constraints are binding. Hence we …nd that credit constraints jeopardize the classical Schumpeterian trade-o¤ between static and dynamic e¢ciency: less static e¢ciency (i.e., lower output) by causing less R&D entails less dynamic e¢ciency (i.e., lower growth). In this case, stronger patent protection reduces the rates of innovation and economic growth, in addition to reducing the level of output.
This …nding is consistent with recent studies that often …nd the presence of negative e¤ects of patent protection on innovation. 1 Furthermore, we …nd that the positive monopolistic-pro…t e¤ect of patent protection prevails when the level of patent protection is below a threshold value, whereas the negative …nancial distortionary e¤ect of patent protection prevails when the level of patent protection is above the threshold. Therefore, the overall e¤ect of patent protection on R&D and innovation follows an inverted-U pattern that is commonly found in empirical studies. 2 We consider the case in which a higher level of …nancial development relaxes credit constraints by making it more di¢cult for borrowers to defraud. As in Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005), we …nd that a higher level of …nancial development stimulates innovation. Intuitively, when R&D entrepreneurs are less likely to defraud, banks are more willing to lend to them for R&D investment. Furthermore, we have a novel …nding that patent protection is more likely to have a positive e¤ect on innovation under a higher level of …nancial development. The intuition of this result can be explained as follows. When banks become more willing to lend to R&D entrepreneurs, the credit constraints are less likely to be binding, in which case patent protection has a positive e¤ect on innovation.
We test this theoretical implication using cross-country panel regression. We …nd that patent protection and …nancial development have a positive interaction e¤ect on innovation. Ang (2010 Ang ( , 2011 ) also empirically explores the e¤ects of patent protection and …nancial development on R&D activities. We complement the analysis in Ang by considering the interaction e¤ect of patent protection and …nancial development on economic growth. Their positive interaction e¤ect on innovation is consistent with our theoretical …nding that patent protection is more likely to have a positive e¤ect on innovation under a higher level of …nancial development. Therefore, to capture the complete e¤ects of patent policy on economic growth, it is useful to explore how the e¤ect of patent protection changes under di¤erent levels of …nancial development.
This study relates to the literature on patent policy. In this literature, Nordhaus (1969) provides the seminal study in which he shows that increasing patent length causes a positive e¤ect on innovation and a negative static distortionary e¤ect on welfare. While Nordhaus fo-cuses on a partial-equilibrium framework, we consider a dynamic general-equilibrium (DGE) model in which the monopolistic distortion caused by patent protection interacts with …nancial frictions to a¤ect credit constraints and sti ‡e innovation. Subsequent studies in this literature, such as Gilbert and Shapiro (1990) and Klemperer (1990) , explore patent breadth in addition to patent length. Scotchmer (2004) provides a comprehensive review of this patent-design literature. Our study instead explores the e¤ects of patent policy in a DGE model in which the …nancial distortionary e¤ect of patent policy arises through a general-equilibrium channel. Therefore, this study relates more closely to the macroeconomic literature on patent policy and economic growth based on DGE models.
The seminal DGE analysis of patent policy is Judd (1985) , who …nds that an in…nite patent length maximizes innovation and eliminates the relative-price distortion because all industries charge the same markup. Our model features an in…nite patent length under which the relative-price distortion is absent as in Judd. 3 However, we show that patent breadth interacts with a …nancial distortion that a¤ects credit constraints and R&D. Subsequent studies in this literature explore patent breadth as an alternative patent-policy instrument; see for example, Li (2001) , Goh and Olivier (2002) and Iwaisako and Futagami (2013) . 4 Some of these studies also …nd that strengthening patent protection has an inverted-U e¤ect on innovation and growth. Our study di¤ers from these previous studies by exploring the e¤ects of patent protection in the presence of …nancial frictions. In other words, we analyze the interaction between patent protection and credit constraints, which is the novel contribution of this study.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 documents stylized facts. Section 3 describes the R&D-based growth model. Section 4 presents theoretical results. The …nal section concludes.
In this section, we document the empirical relationship between patent protection, …nancial development and economic growth. Speci…cally, we use cross-country panel data, which consist of 48 countries from 1998 to 2014. We consider the following empirical speci…cation:
where Growth i;t+1 is the growth rate of GDP or per capita GDP in country i, IP R i;t is an index of patent protection, and F D i;t is the level of …nancial development. i;t denotes a vector of the following control variables: F D i;t , the degree of openness, the unemployment rate and the quality of institutions. 5 Speci…cally, the degree of openness is de…ned as the sum of exports and imports as a share of GDP, whereas the quality of institutions is measured by investment risks from the International Country Risk Guide. 6 i is the country …xed e¤ects.
t is the year …xed e¤ects.
We use the index of patent strength constructed by Papageorgiadis, Cross and Alexiou (2014) to measure the level of patent protection. 7 This patent index has the following advantages. First, observations are available at annual frequency. 8 Second, the index captures patent enforcement in addition to the strength of statutory protection. 9 For the measurement of …nancial development, we follow King and Levine (1993), Beck,
Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2010) and Manova (2013) to use the ratio of private credit by deposit money banks and other …nancial institutions to GDP, denoted by private credit, as a proxy for the overall development of a country's …nancial system. 10 As stated in Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000) , private credit excludes credit granted to the public sector and credit granted by the central bank and development banks, and hence, it better captures the overall level of …nancial development. In addition, we also use the ratio of deposit money banks' assets to GDP, denoted by bank assets, as a robustness check. Data for these two variables can be obtained from the Global Financial Development Database. 11 Di¤erentiating the rate of economic growth with respect to IPR yields
Our theoretical model in the subsequent sections predicts that 1 < 0 and 2 > 0. In other words, for a country that has a low level of …nancial development (i.e., a small F D i;t ), the e¤ect of IPR on economic growth is negative. For a country that has a high level of …nancial development (i.e., a large F D i;t ), the e¤ect of IPR on economic growth becomes positive. Table 1 reports our benchmark results. In the …rst two columns, …nancial development is measured by private credit, whereas in the last two columns, it is measured by bank assets. In some columns, Growth i;t+1 is measured by the growth rate of GDP. In other columns, Growth i;t+1 is measured by the growth rate of GDP per capita. As shown in the Table 1 , all the coe¢cients of the interaction term between patent protection and …nancial development are positive and signi…cant, whereas the coe¢cients of patent protection are all negative and signi…cant. 12 We also run a t-test on patent protection and its interaction with …nancial development, which shows that the e¤ect of patent protection on economic growth is negative and signi…cant for countries with the lowest level of …nancial development (positive and signi…cant for countries with the highest level of …nancial development). To verify the validity of our results, we also drop the highest and lowest one-percent outliers of IPR from our sample. As shown in Table 2 , the results are similar.
[Insert Table 1 and Table 2 here]
AN R&D-BASED GROWTH MODEL WITH CREDIT FRICTIONS
The R&D-based growth model originates from the seminal work by Romer (1990) . In this section, we consider a discrete-time version and follow Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005) to incorporate …nancial frictions into the Romer model.
Households and Workers/Entrepreneurs
There is a unit continuum of in…nitely-lived households. These households own intangible capital (in the form of patents that generate monopolistic pro…ts) and consume …nal good (numeraire). The lifetime utility function of a household is given by
where the parameter > 0 is the subjective discount rate and C t is consumption of the household at time t. The asset-accumulation equation is A t+1 = (1 + r t )A t C t . From standard dynamic optimization, the linear utility function implies that in equilibrium the real interest rate is equal to the discount rate, such that r t = for all t.
In addition to the in…nitely-lived households in the economy, we follow previous studies to assume the presence of overlapping generations of workers/entrepreneurs in each period to create a need for the entrepreneurs to borrow funding for R&D. At the beginning of each period t, L workers enter the economy, and they work to earn wage W t . At the end of the period, each worker becomes an entrepreneur and devotes part of her wage income W t to R&D, where 2 (0; 1]. 13 At the beginning of the next period, those entrepreneurs who have succeeded in their R&D projects sell their inventions to households and use the proceeds for consumption. Without loss of generality, we normalize L to unity. A worker who enters the economy in period t has the utility function
y t denotes consumption when young and E t [o t+1 ] denotes expected consumption when old.
If the amount of her R&D spending Z t is less than W t , then a worker/entrepreneur simply consumes W t Z t in period t or saves part of it subject to the market interest rate r t .
However, if Z t > W t , then the worker/entrepreneur would need to apply for a loan subject to credit constraints, which will be described in details in Section 3.7.
Final Good
The …nal-good sector is perfectly competitive. Firms in this sector employ workers and use a mass of di¤erentiated intermediate goods v 2 [0; N t ] to produce …nal good using the following production function:
where the parameter 2 (0; 1) determines labor intensity 1 in production. L t is labor
and N t is the number of available intermediate goods at time t. Competitive …rms take the prices of …nal good and factor inputs as given to maximize pro…t. The conditional labor demand function is given by
where L t = L = 1 from the market-clearing condition. The conditional demand function for intermediate good v is given by
Intermediate Goods
Each di¤erentiated intermediate good v is produced by a …rm that owns the patent of the product and has market power, which is determined by the level of patent protection to be explained below. In industry v, the …rm produces x t (v) units of intermediate goods using
x t (v) units of …nal good as inputs. Therefore, the pro…t function of the …rm in industry v is
where the second equality follows from (5) .
Using (6), one can derive the pro…t-maximizing price p t (v) given by 1= . To capture the e¤ects of patent protection, we follow Goh and Olivier (2002) to model patent breadth 2 (1; 1= ) as a policy parameter. The idea is that the unit cost for imitative …rms to
is , which is assumed to be increasing in the level of patent protection.
Therefore, a larger patent breadth allows the monopolistic producer of x t (v), who owns the patent, to charge a higher markup without losing her market share. 14 In this case,
Combining (6) and (7), we obtain the amount of pro…t as a function of patent breadth given by
which is increasing in patent breadth for < 1= .
Aggregate Production Function
Substituting (5) and (7) into (4) yields
Equation (9) shows that the growth rate of Y t is determined by the growth rate of N t .
Furthermore, for a given N t , the level of Y t is decreasing in patent breadth , which captures the e¤ect of markup distortion on the level of output. 15 In other words, by increasing the price of intermediate goods, a larger markup leads to less intermediate goods being produced and also less …nal good being produced. 16 In the presence of credit constraints, patent protection would then generate a negative e¤ect on R&D as a result of this markup distortion as we will show later.
R&D and the Value of Patents
There is an R&D sector. In each period t, workers/entrepreneurs devote …nal good to R&D at the end of the period to invent new intermediate goods that will be produced in the next period. To ensure balanced growth, we assume that each entrepreneur spreads her R&D spending Z t over N t R&D projects. 17 Therefore, the amount of …nal good that an entrepreneur devotes to each of her R&D projects is Z t =N t , and the probability of her R&D projects being successful is P t = minfZ t =(N t t ); 1g, 18 where 1= t captures the productivity in R&D. We adopt the following speci…cation for t :
where > 0 and 2 (0; 1). The term (Z t =N t ) captures an intratemporal duplication externality of R&D as in Jones and Williams (2000) . Given the unit continuum of R&D entrepreneurs and the independence of R&D projects (across entrepreneurs), the law of large numbers applies, so that the accumulation of inventions at the aggregate level follows a deterministic process given by
where Z t = t = N t Z t =(N t t ) is the number of successful R&D projects in period t.
Each R&D project has a probability P t to give rise to a new variety of intermediate goods. When a new variety is successfully invented at the end of period t, production of the intermediate goods begins in period t + 1. We denote the value of an invention created in period t as V t (v). The discount rate for future pro…ts is given by r t = for all t. V t (v) can be expressed as
which is increasing in patent breadth . The positive e¤ect of captures the positive e¤ect of patent protection on the value of inventions.
Equilibrium Without Credit Constraints
In this section, we explore the equilibrium level of R&D in the absence of credit constraints.
The zero-expected-pro…t condition of R&D is given by P
Therefore, the level of R&D at time t is given by
which is increasing in . The growth rate of technology in the absence of credit constraints is given by
The growth rate g 1 in (15) 
PROPOSITION 1
In the absence of credit constraints, stronger patent protection leads to a higher growth rate of technology.
Proof. Use (8) and (15) to show that g 1 is increasing in .
Equilibrium With Credit Constraints
Before the end of a period, each entrepreneur devotes her wage income W t to N t R&D projects without borrowing. If the R&D spending Z t exceeds her wage income W t , then she would have to borrow D t = Z t W t from a bank to …nance her R&D projects. If her R&D projects succeed, she repays the loan plus an interest payment equal to (1 + R t+1 )D t at the end of the period. If her R&D projects fail, she becomes bankrupt and repays nothing to the bank. Therefore, if the entrepreneur truthfully reveals the outcome of her R&D projects, the expected payment received by the bank is P t (1 + R t+1 )D t + (1 P t )0. When banks make zero expected pro…t, we have
In other words, a higher probability P t of R&D success reduces the interest rate R t+1 charged by competitive banks.
What makes it di¢cult to borrow is that an entrepreneur may want to default even when her projects are successful. As in Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005), banks do not observe the outcome of R&D projects, and hence, the problem of moral hazard arises. 19 Speci…cally, by paying a hiding cost hZ t where h 2 (0; 1), an entrepreneur can hide the outcome of her projects and avoid repaying the loan. The cost parameter h is an indicator of banks' e¤ectiveness in securing repayment and measures the level of …nancial development.
We follow Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes to assume that in case an entrepreneur decides to defraud, the entrepreneur must incur the hiding cost before observing the outcome of her R&D projects. Therefore, entrepreneurs would not defraud if and only if the following incentive-compatibility (IC) constraint holds:
where the last equality uses (9) . We refer to this IC constraint as a credit constraint, which becomes tighter as patent breadth increases capturing an interaction between the monopolistic distortion of patent protection and the …nancial distortion of the credit constraint.
The intuition can be explained as follows. When patent breadth increases, aggregate income Y decreases due to the markup distortion. As a result, a larger reduces the income of entrepreneurs and their ability to borrow for R&D. This interaction e¤ect exists so long as entrepreneurs' ability to borrow is a¤ected by their income and in turn entrepreneurs'
income is related to aggregate income.
For convenience, we de…ne f (1 )=(1 h) 2 (0; 1) as a composite parameter that is increasing in the hiding cost h. Then, substituting (17) into (11) yields the growth rate of technology, in the presence of a binding credit constraint, as follows:
The equilibrium growth rate g 2 in (18) is decreasing in the level of patent breadth capturing the abovementioned …nancial distortionary e¤ect of patent protection on innovation.
Furthermore, a higher level of …nancial development f re ‡ected by a larger hiding cost increases the growth rate of technology as in Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005). 20 We summarize these results in Proposition 2.
PROPOSITION 2
In the presence of binding credit constraints, stronger patent protection leads to a lower growth rate of technology. A higher level of …nancial development leads to a higher growth rate of technology.
Proof. Use (18) to show that g 2 is decreasing in and increasing in f .
In the previous section, we …nd that when the credit constraint is not binding, our model features the classic trade-o¤ of patent protection that yields a static loss in output and a dynamic gain in growth. In this section, we show that when the credit constraint becomes binding, this trade-o¤ disappears. Speci…cally, the dynamic gain becomes a dynamic loss in growth whereas the static loss in output is still present.
Equations (14) and (17) show that the equilibrium level of R&D spending Z t satis…es
There exists a unique value of patent breadth below (above) which the credit constraint does not bind (is binding) in the long run. Equating [ ( )=( )] 1= and ( = ) =(1 ) f yields this threshold value , which is determined by
where the left-hand side of (20) is increasing in . Therefore, the threshold value is increasing in f . The intuition of this result can be explained as follows. A larger hiding cost reduces entrepreneurs' incentives to defraud and enables them to borrow more funding for R&D. In this case, the credit constraint is less likely to be binding, which in turn increases the threshold value of patent breadth.
PATENT BREADTH AND CREDIT CONSTRAINTS
Based on the results in the previous section, we can consider two scenarios. First, the level of patent breadth satis…es < , where the threshold is derived in (20) . Second, the level of patent breadth satis…es > . According to this classi…cation, the equilibrium growth rate is given by g = 8 > > < > > :
.
(21)
We summarize these results in Proposition 3.
PROPOSITION 3
When the level of patent protection is below , the equilibrium growth rate is increasing in patent breadth. When the level of patent protection is above , the equilibrium growth rate is decreasing in patent breadth and increasing in the hiding cost.
The overall e¤ect of patent breadth on the equilibrium growth rate follows an inverted-U pattern, and the growth-maximizing level of patent breath is increasing in the level of …nancial development.
Proof. Use (21) to show that (a) g 2 is increasing in f and (b) g is initially increasing in and then becomes decreasing in after passing the threshold . Then, use (20) to show that is increasing in f .
When the level of patent protection is below , entrepreneurs are not …nancially constrained. In this case, stronger patent protection increases the amount of monopolistic pro…t, which in turn stimulates R&D and increases the equilibrium growth rate. When the level of patent protection is above , entrepreneurs become …nancially constrained. In this case, stronger patent protection ampli…es monopolistic distortion and reduces the level of output, which in turn tightens the credit constraint on R&D and decreases the equilibrium growth rate. A higher level of …nancial development increases the hiding cost, which in turn enables the entrepreneurs to borrow more funding for R&D and increases the equilibrium growth rate.
For a given hiding cost, an increase in the level of patent protection may cause the …nancial constraint to change from non-binding to binding; therefore, there exists a growthmaximizing level of patent protection . This growth-maximizing level of patent protection is determined by the level of …nancial development f . Speci…cally,
is increasing in f .
Therefore, as a country becomes more …nancially developed, it should implement a stronger patent system to stimulate innovation. Intuitively, as mentioned before, a larger hiding cost reduces entrepreneurs' incentives to defraud, which enables them to borrow more funding for R&D. In this case, the credit constraint is less likely to be binding, which in turn increases the threshold value of patent breadth and renders patent protection more likely to have a positive e¤ect on R&D. We summarize this result in Proposition 4, which is consistent with the stylized facts in Section 2.
PROPOSITION 4 Patent protection is more likely to have a positive e¤ect on innovation under a higher level of …nancial development.
Proof.
Because is increasing in f as shown in (20), a larger f expands the range of in which g is increasing in .
Extensions
In this section, we consider an alternative assumption under which R&D entrepreneurs' ability to borrow depends on pro…t income in addition to wage income. For simplicity, we assume = 1; in other words, the entrepreneurs can devote to R&D projects the entire amount of wage income W t and pro…t income ( )N t . 21 In this case, the amount of borrowing becomes
As a result, the IC constraint hZ t D t can be expressed as
Substituting (23) into (11) yields the growth rate of technology under a binding credit constraint as follows:
where ( )
Therefore, under a binding credit constraint, the equilibrium growth rate is decreasing in patent breadth even when the entrepreneurs can also devote pro…t income into R&D. Intuitively, the negative e¤ect of patent protection on wage income dominates its positive e¤ect on pro…t income in our model.
However, if entrepreneurs can use the value of existing patents, instead of just current pro…t income, as means of internal …nance, then the positive e¤ect of patent protection on the value of patents may relax the credit constraint. To explore this scenario, we consider
another assumption under which R&D entrepreneurs' ability to borrow depends on the value of patents in addition to wage income. In this case, the amount of borrowing becomes
Substituting (27) into (11) yields the growth rate of technology under a binding credit constraint as follows:
where
Di¤erentiating ( ) with respect to yields
which is negative if and only if
Even if we consider a conservatively low annual discount rate of 3.5% and 20 years for one generation, then the discount rate would be equal to (1 + 0:035) 20 1 = 0:99, which in turn implies that the above inequality is likely to hold. Therefore, this section con…rms the robustness of our theoretical results.
CONCLUSION
In this study, we have explored the e¤ects of patent protection and …nancial development on economic growth. We …nd that whether strengthening patent protection has a positive or negative e¤ect on technological progress depends on credit constraints. When credit constraints are not binding, strengthening patent protection has a positive e¤ect on economic growth. When credit constraints are binding, strengthening patent protection has a negative e¤ect on growth. An increase in the level of patent protection may cause the credit constraints to become binding. As a result, the overall e¤ect of patent protection on economic growth follows an inverted-U pattern. A higher level of …nancial development relaxes credit constraints by increasing the hiding cost. As a result, a higher level of …nancial development stimulates innovation. Furthermore, patent protection is more likely to have a positive e¤ect on innovation under a higher level of …nancial development. Our regression results
show that strengthening patent protection is indeed more likely to have a positive e¤ect on innovation under a higher level of …nancial development. Therefore, this study shows the importance of an often neglected interaction between the monopolistic distortion caused by patent protection and the …nancial distortion caused by credit constraints.
APPENDIX: DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA SET
The empirical analysis is based on a panel dataset for 48 countries from 1998 to 2014.
Variables used in the regressions are listed below with de…nitions and data sources. Table   A1 reports the summary statistics of these variables. 17 To ensure the innovation probability P t 1 in the presence of growth in Z t , we only need to assume that entrepreneurs spread their R&D spending Z t over &N t R&D projects, where & > 0. Without loss of generality, we set & = 1. 18 For simplicity, we assume that an entrepreneur's R&D projects either all succeed or all fail. 19 As in Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes, we do not consider the case in which patents can be used as collateral.
To be more precise, we assume that future patents cannot be used as collateral because R&D projects have not been completed as the stage of borrowing. See Amable, Chatelain and Ralf (2010) for an interesting analysis on patents as collateral. 20 If …nancial friction is modeled as screening of R&D projects as in Aghion and Howitt (2009, Ch. 6) instead of credit constraints, then …nancial development would still stimulate innovation. However, patent breadth would no longer have a negative e¤ect on innovation due to the absence of credit constraints.
In reality, …nancial development should a¤ect the screening of R&D projects and the tightness of credit constraints. So long as credit constraints are present, the negative e¤ect of patent breadth on innovation would exist whenever they are binding. Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. IPR denotes the index of patent protection. FD denotes the level of …nancial development. Other control variables include FD, the degree of openness, the unemployment rate and the quality of institutions. In the …rst two columns, …nancial development is measured by private credit, whereas in the last two columns it is measured by bank assets. The dependent variable is economic growth measured by either the growth rate of GDP or the growth rate of GDP per capita. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Note: In this table, we drop the highest and lowest one-percent outliers of IPR. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. IPR denotes the index of patent protection. FD denotes the level of …nancial development. Other control variables include FD, the degree of openness, the unemployment rate and the quality of institutions.
In the …rst two columns, …nancial development is measured by private credit, whereas in the last two columns it is measured by bank assets. The dependent variable is economic growth measured by either the growth rate of GDP or the growth rate of GDP per capita. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
